![]() However, COVID-19 severely hit middle-class households in urban areas, which required figuring out the households most affected to so they could get help. When a country faces budget constraints, much of the budget for poverty relief is focused on the bottom of the pyramid. This is in part because the pandemic affected some types of industries, such as hospitality and service industries, more than others. For example, my work focuses on social protections, and one of the important descriptive facts about the COVID-19 pandemic was that the definition for the type of people that we traditionally think of as vulnerable changed. The COVID-19 crisis has emphasized the need to find newly vulnerable populations and identify the best way to include them in policy programs. Professor Hanna is also the faculty chair of the Leading Smart Policy Design: A Multisectoral Approach to Economic Decisions executive program.Īs an expert in improving the provision of public services in developing and emerging nations, particularly for the very poor, can you share a bit more about the current priorities in the field today? She serves as the faculty director of Evidence for Policy Design (EPoD) at Harvard University’s Center for International Development and is the co-Scientific Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) Southeast Asia Office in Indonesia. Rema Hanna is the Jeffrey Cheah Professor of South-East Asia Studies and chair of the International Development Area at Harvard Kennedy School. ![]() Taubman Center for State and Local Government.Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy.Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government.Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy.Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation.They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. ![]() In this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service.
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